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While much reaction to the Brexit decision has been one of shock, others commentators 
said they saw it coming (Cohen 2016; Clarke et al. 2016; Boyer this volume). The Brexiters 
seemed pretty surprised themselves: fifty-four per cent of those who voted Leave hadn’t 
expected to win (Lord Ashcroft Polls 2016). Perhaps the biggest shock was to the broken 
hubris of the British political establishment revealing the fractured nature of British business 
elites and the weakening of the existing social order over the past thirty years. (Morgan this 
volume).  
 
As the results sank in, pandemonium broke out. As the only Prime Ministerial candidate left 
standing Theresa May stepped in. Brexit became a catalyst: releasing vitriolic feuds in the 
British Labour Party; resuscitating aspirations for a second Scottish Independence 
Referendum and worrying those involved in the Northern Ireland peace settlement. Despite 
claims that ‘we should have seen this coming’, no one could have predicted the dizzying 
levels of political bedlam and cluelessness that ensued (Wood and Wright this volume). 
 
The antecedents for Brexit had been bubbling under the surface of British politics for a long 
time. David Cameron triggered the referendum as a means to contain the right wing margins 
of the Conservative Party and stem the rising tide of the ‘people’s army’ of UKIP. Much to 
their own surprise the Conservatives won a majority in the 2015 General Election. The 
referendum promise, that had potentially been part of an anticipated coalition trade off, had 
now become a manifesto pledge.  
 
It was an accident waiting to happen, according to Warhurst (this volume), and the result of 
a long-awaited crisis of extreme social polarisation according to Boyer (this volume). 
However, the heterogeneous coalition of Leave voters suggests other characteristics 
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contributed to this outcome (Grey this volume). Brexit revealed a very ugly face of 
xenophobia and violence that hadn’t been visible for decades, witnessing the attack and 
subsequent death of the MP Jo Cox during the campaign and a rise in hate crimes since 
(NPCC 2016; Home Office 2016). The dominant issue is commonly assumed to be migration 
according to Le Galès and Frerichs and Sankari (this volume). While undoubtedly significant, 
evidence from Lord Ashcroft Polls (2016) cite ‘gaining back control’ was the primary 
motivation to vote Leave, even if ironically this is likely to increase the UK’s economic 
vulnerability (Froud et al. this volume).  
 
As predicted the value of sterling plummeted, alongside a worse than expected 
manufacturing slump (Khan 2016). The Bank of England injected £3.1bn into UK banks, ready 
to provide an additional £250 billion to backstop markets (Rodionova 2016); subsequently 
interest rates were cut to bolster the economy. Negative economic consequences will affect 
Germany, whose foreign trade with the UK amounted to over €89 billion in 2015, the UK 
being their third most important trading partner after the US and France (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2016). Smaller more vulnerable countries dependent on trade with the UK, like 
the Irish Republic, have been described as the sitting in the passenger seat of the Brexit car-
crash (Fingleton 2016). For many the prospects are bleak; for others this is an opportunity to 
create new economic and social institutions for the digital age (Colin 2016) and embolden 
progressive movements (Fazi 2016). 
 
Looking for concepts to help us analyse and understand the causes and consequences of the 
Brexit vote I draw on some of the interpretations we made of the financial crisis of 2008, 
using the concept of ‘fault lines’ and the Polanyian concept of a double movement (O’Reilly 
et al. 2011).  These concepts draw attention to the fractured coalitions supporting leave, and 
the extent to which this can be seen as a reaction to protect against the negative impacts of 
globalization and neo-liberalism. 
 
Socio-economic Fault Lines  
The concept of ‘fault lines’ used by the economist Rajan (2010) identified deeply embedded 
flaws in the international system of financial regulation that caused the 2008 financial crisis. 
His seminal article Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier? (Rajan 2005) was the 
first to predict the financial crisis. He argued that accentuated risk taking by financial 
intermediaries had generated enormous wealth and access to finance. But this behaviour 
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exacerbated fluctuations: the risks taken made their organizations and subsequently private 
households financially more interdependent and vulnerable. Rajan (2010) proposed greater 
control and more prudent supervision was necessary so that ‘market friendly’ policies would 
reduce the incentives for intermediaries to take excessive risks. At the time he was ignored 
because government regulation of the sector was too closely tied to the interests of the 
large financial organizations benefitting from these risky and highly profitable transactions 
(Rajan, 2010: 180–81). David Cameron’s political risk taking with a ‘dash of Bullingdon 
hubris’, and a series of unexpected outcomes, like winning the 2015 general election, has 
some parallels with the profile of a particularly powerful political class that Rajan identifies 
prior to the financial crisis.  
 
But these elites have become increasingly fractured (Morgan this volume) and incapable of 
effective action (Wood and Wright this volume). Froud et al. suggest that ‘multiple 
interconnected economies’ have generated splintered economic experiences. These cannot 
be simply read off in terms of a process of bifurcated class and immiseration, or the 
unappreciated effects of European investment to compensate for the fundamental shifts in 
the structure of employment (Warhurst this volume). These variegated distinctions and 
experiences are discussed by Grey (this volume) in terms of ‘cosmopolitans’ and ‘locals’. 
Locals represent a ‘contradictory coalition’ of communities combining ‘elements of 
nationalist traditionalism with economic globalization’ cutting across traditional political 
divides. The Brexit referendum unveiled a growing disjuncture between a politically divided 
population and the institutions failing to represent and protect them.  
 
The Referendum Results 
 
The Brexit ‘fault lines’ of political and social divisions cut across regions, generations, class 
and ethnic cleavages in a visibly disunited kingdom. The results have been well established 
and discussed (Ashcroft and Culwick 2016): Scotland voted Remain; Northern Ireland was 
divided, and England and Wales voted Leave. Support for Remain was strongest in the major 
cities of England and weakest in the provinces (BBC 2016a). Older voters were more likely to 
have voted Leave while nearly three quarters (73%) of 18 to 24 year-olds voted Remain; 
although a lot less young people turned out to vote. The university educated voted Remain 
and those who had left school at 18 or younger voted Leave. Most people with children aged 
ten or under voted Remain; while most of those with children aged 11 or older voted Leave. 
A majority of those working full- or part-time voted Remain; whereas most of those not 
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working, because they were unemployed, retired or ‘inactive’ voted Leave (Lord Ashcroft 
2016). Leave voters were, as Grey points out, a motley coalition.  
 
A frequently held interpretation has been that Remain voters lost in the traditional, 
disaffected and deindustrialised Labour heartlands of the North and amongst the working 
class. But Williams (2016) argues it wasn’t quite a simple as that: most Leave voters, apart 
from London, were from the south. High proportions of Leave votes were registered in 
traditional industrial areas in the Midlands and the North East; but the highest proportion of 
Leave voters came from more rural locations and from the south-west and the south in 
general (BBC 2016a).  
 
Nearly two thirds of manual workers (64%) voted Leave, and their voice was augmented by 
approximately half of the middle classes who also voted Leave; a majority of the 
professionals and managerial classes voted Remain (57%). Looking at housing characteristics 
of Leave voters illustrates this unusual ‘contradictory coalition’. Those who owned their own 
home, without a mortgage (most probably older voters and the very rich), and two thirds of 
council and housing association tenants voted Leave; homeowners with a mortgage voted 
Remain (Lord Ashcroft 2016).  
 
Gender divisions were not evident, but ethnic divisions were; and they were also fractured. 
White voters were slightly more likely to vote Leave (53%) than to vote Remain (47%). Two 
thirds (67%) of those describing themselves as Asian voted to remain, as did three quarters 
(73%) of black voters. Nearly six in ten (58%) of those describing themselves as Christian 
voted to leave while seven in ten Muslims voted Remain. However, some migrants from the 
Commonwealth who voted Leave did so because they wanted a fairer system of migration 
that did not give preferential treatment to East Europeans over people from their own 
countries (Parveen 2016).  
 
Brexit unveiled fault lines in the fractured face of class divisions in the UK. It revealed 
unexpected alliances of shared opinion mobilised around an over simplified and highly 
emotional in-out choice. It cut across business elites (Morgan this volume), regional 
economies (Froud et al. this volume), local and cosmopolitan identities (Grey this volume); 
and employment statuses (Warhurst this volume). 
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Political Fault lines  
 
But these fault lines amongst voters are not limited to the UK. ‘Soft’ and ‘hard’ forms of 
Euroscepticism range from disenchantment with the European project to outright 
opposition (Szczerbiak and Taggert’s (2008a and b). Political contagion from Brexit has yet to 
be felt in the extent to which it will bolster right-wing populist movements across Europe 
(Stokes et al. 2016; Emmerson et al. 2016; Rona-Tas this volume). The evidence to date has 
been mixed. The Spanish elections in June resulted in a hung parliament and disappointing 
support for the anti-austerity Podemos; the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) 
delivered a stinging defeat to Merkel in local elections in September; but Viktor Orbán’s 
October referendum opposing EU refugee quotas was humiliatingly boycotted by Hungarian 
voters with less than a 50 per cent turnout (Economist 2016b). There has been a significant 
and visible rise in the radical right in many of these countries (Economist 2016a; Le Galès 
and Rona-Tas this volume), but recent evidence indicates that there is also considerable 
support for the EU from Polish and Hungarian voters, while Greek, French and Spanish 
voters are less favourably disposed (Stokes 2016).  
 
There has been a growing level of dissatisfaction with the handling of the economic and the 
migrant crisis, and limited support for a closer union (Frerichs and Sankari this volume). 
There is evidence of a growing inward looking public opinion focused on domestic issues 
especially from those on the political right (Stokes et al. 2016). Although many also want the 
EU to play a more active international role in the future, this internationalist stance has the 
strongest support in Germany and Sweden. In contrast the French are more despondent, as 
their international position has declined.  
 
This perception of the effect of changing international status is also echoed in Grob-
Fitzgibbon’s (2016) analysis of the UK. He argues that the un-reconciled longings for the loss 
of Empire and post-imperial nostalgia are where we find the roots of Eurosceptism in Britain. 
Nearly half (49%) of Leave voters said the main reason for their choice was about 
sovereignty: “the principle that decisions about the UK should be taken in the UK”. One third 
(33%) said that leaving “offered the best chance for the UK to regain control over 
immigration and its own borders.” Leavers saw more threats than opportunities to their 
standard of living from the way the economy and society are changing – and they felt that 
opportunities for their children had deteriorated. Leave voters were more likely than 
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Remain voters to see multiculturalism, feminism, the Green movement, globalisation and 
immigration as forces for ill (Lord Ashcroft 2016).  
 
Polanyi outlined in the Great Transformation how the destructive forces of laissez faire 
liberalism encountered a counter reaction from unions and socialist parties to protect 
vulnerable groups from the potentially destructive outcomes of markets. We are currently at 
a point of rapid transformation where multi-dimensional crises challenge the post-war neo-
liberal economic order; these challenges emerge from changing labor markets, welfare 
states and financial markets reforms (Colin and Palier 2015). As traditional political 
affiliations are weakening, the distinction between left and right becomes increasingly 
blurred and the legitimacy of political institutions and parties is being questioned. The 
attitude of Leave voters and the strapline on their campaign ‘take back control’ clearly 
reflects an anxiety with the rapid transformations changing the complexion and structure of 
society. The Leave vote was not just a protest against the political establishment in 
Westminster and Brussels, but also a naïve desire to re-establish some form of ‘protective’ 
control. This could be interpreted as reflecting the sentiment associated with the double 
movement (Polanyi (1957 [1944] 2001), but as Stiglitz argues in his forward to The Great 
Transformation: “rapid transformation destroys old coping mechanisms, old safety nets, while 
it creates a new set of demands, before new coping mechanisms are developed.” (p.xi). The 
Brexit vote unveiled how these new coping mechanisms are currently missing.  
 
Discussion Forum 
 
This Discussion Forum emanates from a spontaneous seminar organised at the SASE 
conference in Berkeley on the 25th June, followed by a call for contributions in the journal. 
The papers here draw attention to the fractured nature of business elites (Morgan), elite 
incompetence (Wood and Wright), and divisions between locals and cosmopolitans (Grey). 
Differential regional economic performance (Froud et al.) and how the growth of poor 
quality jobs have contributed to the frustration expressed in the Brexit vote (Warhurst). The 
impact of migration and welfare rights reforms to create a more closely bound solidaristic 
EU (Frerichs and Sankari) contribute to some of the growing economic inequalities that 
found expression in the Brexit vote, alongside the tradition of British exceptionalism in the 
EU (Le Galès). The tensions created by globalization and democracy in other parts of Europe 
are explored by Rona-Tas, with a final prediction of a dark radical uncertainty in the face of 
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dysfunctional economic policy, with the domination of competition over solidarity and the 
failures around the refugee crisis from Boyer. The Brexit referendum exposed multiple fault 
lines in the UK. It brought to the surface and gave a public platform and voice to divisions 
that were deeply embedded, sometimes illogical, but until now had either been ignored or 
hushed out of ‘respectable’ public debate. The ‘unprecedented geo-political shift’ (BBC 
2016b) resulting from Brexit reflects deeper fault lines beyond the UK.  
 
2344 words 
References 
Ashcroft, M. and Culwick, K. (2016) ‘Well you did ask… Why the UK voted to leave the EU’ 
(London: Biteback Publishing) 
BBC (2016a) ‘EU referendum: The result in maps and charts’ 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36616028 accessed 24th June 2016 
BBC (2016b) ‘Brexit: 'An unprecedented geopolitical shift' http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-eu-referendum-36625209 25th June, accessed 28th June. 
Clarke, H.D., Goodwin, M. and Whiteley, P. (2016) ‘Leave was always in the lead: why the 
polls go the referendum result wrong’ 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/07/12/leave-always-lead accessed 3rd 
August 
Cohen, D. (2016) ‘Brexit: A Crisis Long In The Making’ Social Europe 
https://www.socialeurope.eu/2016/07/brexit-crisis-long-making accessed 3rd 
August 
Colin, N. (2016) ‘Brexit: Doom, or Europe’s Polanyi Moment?’TheFamily Papers #022 
https://salon.thefamily.co/brexit-doom-or-europes-polanyi-moment-
3e97269e6b67#.98qkxfl2q accessed 10th October 2016. 
Colin, N. and B. Palier (2015) ‘The Next Safety Net: Social Policy for a Digital Age’ Foreign 
Affairs July/Aug Issue https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-06-16/next-
safety-net  
Fazi, T. (2016) ‘Brexit: A Massive Smokescreen (But Britain Should Still Leave)’ Social Europe 
7th June https://www.socialeurope.eu/2016/06/brexit-massive-smokescreen-
britain-still-leave/ accessed 24th June 2016 
Grob-Fitzgibbon, B. (2016) Continental Drift: Britain and Europe from the End of Empire to 
the Rise of Euroscepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
 8 
Economist (2016) ‘The rise of the far right in Europe’ The Economist 24th May 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/05/daily-chart-18 accessed 
8th August 2016. 
Economist (2016b) ‘A defeat for populism in Hungary’ The Economist 3rd October 
http://www.economist.com/node/21708083/print 
Emmerson, C., Johnson, P. and Mitchell, I. (2016) ‘The EU Single Market: The Value of 
Membership versus Access to the UK’ Institute of Fiscal Studies 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/8411 accessed 10th August 2016. 
Fingelton, J. (2016) ‘Ireland is the passenger in the Brexit car crash’ Irish Times 1st June 
http://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/john-fingleton-ireland-is-the-passenger-in-the-
brexit-car-crash-1.2705745 accessed 30th June 2016. 
Home Office (2016) ‘Action Against Hate: The UK Government’s plan for tackling hate crime’ 
26th July 2016 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hate-crime-action-
plan-2016 accessed 6th August 2016. 
Khan, M. (2016) ‘Pound extends decline on post-Brexit manufacturing slip’ Financial Times 
1st August https://next.ft.com/content/91cdc66a-598f-3b09-bbef-d591bf725657 
accessed 7th August 
Lord Ashcroft Polls (2016) ‘How the United Kingdom voted on Thursday… and why’ Lord 
Ashcroft Polls http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-
voted-and-why accessed 24th June 2016. 
NPCC (2016) ‘Hate crime undermines the diversity and tolerance we should instead be 
celebrating.’ (National Police Chiefs’ Council) 8th July 
http://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/hate-crime-undermines-the-diversity-and-
tolerance-we-should-instead-be-celebrating-1. Accessed 6th August 2016. 
O’Reilly, J., Lain, D., Sheehan, M., Smale, B. and Stuart, M. (2011) ‘Managing Uncertainty: 
The crisis, its consequences and the global workforce’ Work, Employment and 
Society 25(4): 581-595.  
Parveen, N. (2016) ‘Why do some ethnic minority voters want to leave the EU? The 
Guardian, 1st June, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/01/british-
asians-views-eu-referendum-figures-brexit accessed 7th August 
Polanyi, K. (1957 [1944] 2001) The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins 
of Our Time.; forward by Joseph E. Stiglitz Boston, MA: Beacon Press. 
Rajan, R. G.  (2010) Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press) 
 9 
Rajan, R. G. (2005) "Has financial development made the world riskier?," Proceedings - 
Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 
issue Aug, pages 313-369 available as NBER Working Paper No. 11728 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11728  
Rodionova, Z. (2016) ‘Bank of England injects UK banking system with £3.1 bn of funding 
after Brexit’ The Independent 28th June 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/bank-of-england-injects-uk-
banking-system-with-31bn-of-funding-after-brexit-a7107981.html accessed 28th 
June 2016. 
Statistisches Bundesamt (2016) Foreign trade: Ranking of Germany's trading partners in 
foreign trade (Wiesbaden, Federal Statistical Office) 
https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/ForeignTr
ade/TradingPartners/Tables/OrderRankGermanyTradingPartners.pdf?__blob=public
ation File accessed 10th October 2016. 
Stokes, B. (2016) ‘Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit: Significant opposition in key European 
countries to an ever closer EU’ Pew Research Center: Global Attitudes and Trends 7th 
June http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/07/euroskepticism-beyond-brexit 
accessed 5th August 2016. 
Stokes, B., Wike, R. and Poushter, J. (2016) ‘Europeans Face the World Divided’ Pew Global 
Attitudes Project 13th June http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/13/europeans-face-
the-world-divided/ accessed 6th August 2016. 
Szczerbiak, A.  and P. Taggert (2008a) Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of 
Euroscepticism: Volume 1: Case Studies and Country Surveys (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
Szczerbiak, A.  and P. Taggert (2008b) Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of 
Euroscepticism: Volume 2: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
Williams, Z. (2016) ‘Think the north and the poor caused Brexit? Think again’ The Guardian 
7th August https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/aug/07/north-poor-
brexit-myths accessed 7th August. 
 
 10 
 
